

A TEMPORAL ANALYSIS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION BACKED REGIONALISATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

Seven ERDOĞAN & Murat POYRAZ

Introduction

Regionalization has been a significant and enduring trend in world politics, particularly since the end of the Second World War. The phenomenon has undergone considerable evolution over the past decades, reflecting the evolving dynamics of international relations and the various factors affecting the formation of regional entities. At its core, regionalization can be understood as a multifaceted process arising from the complex interplay between internal regional factors - such as geography, shared social and cultural ties – and external influences, including the rise of new global powers or systemic changes in the international order (Song, 2007; Panke & Starkmann, 2021; Brusylovska, 2023). As a result of regionalization processes, regions are becoming entities, sometimes in the form of regional organisations, with the capacity to shape the flow of developments in global politics, including regionalization in other geographies (Rüland, 2022).

Understanding the complexities of regionalization is crucial to gaining a more comprehensive perspective on current global politics and their future trajectories. As regions become more prominent actors in the international system, their interactions, both within and beyond their borders, play a critical role in shaping the future dynamics of global politics. Despite the challenges associated with understanding these processes, such an understanding is essential for policymakers, scholars and practitioners alike, as it offers valuable insights into the evolving nature of global governance and the potential directions of international cooperation and conflict.

The phenomenon of global regionalization is clearly observable in the Mediterranean, where a certain degree of regionalization has taken place, thus allowing the region to be considered as an international entity in its own right. This

chapter deals with the influence of the European Union (EU) on regionalisation processes in the Mediterranean, by conducting a temporal analysis of the EU's engagement through diverse stages.

The chapter begins with an examination of the EU's early involvement in the Mediterranean, a period during which the Union had not yet established itself as a formal foreign policy actor. During this initial phase, the EU's engagement was more limited and less structured, reflecting the broader context of its evolving role in international relations. Next, the chapter examines the period when the EU's engagement in the Mediterranean intensified, coinciding with its emergence as a competent and influential foreign policy actor. This stage is characterised by the use of several strategic policy instruments aimed at promoting regional cooperation and integration. The EU's initiatives during this period were more robust and comprehensive, reflecting its growing ambitions and capabilities on the global stage. Finally, the chapter discusses recent regionalization dynamics in the Mediterranean, with a particular focus on the Arab Spring as a critical turning point. Overall, the chapter provides a nuanced analysis of the EU's evolving role in the Mediterranean, highlighting how its influence has shaped and continues to shape regionalization dynamics in this strategically important region.

Earlier Involvement of the European Union in the Mediterranean

The Mediterranean has always been an area of interest to the countries of Europe over the centuries, due to its geographical proximity and strategic importance. As a result, there have always been close contacts between European and Mediterranean countries. Many of the founding members of the EU, notably France, were closely linked and had special ties and dense commercial relations to the south of Mediterranean thanks to the former colonial relations. While the non-member Mediterranean countries were exporting mostly agricultural and energy products to the EU, member states were heavily selling manufactured goods to the region (Gomez, 2023). This is why the promotion of relations and

cooperation with the Mediterranean countries was identified as a priority area by the EU in the late 1960s.

France led the EU to conclude association agreements with two Maghreb countries, Morocco and Tunisia, by the late 1960s (Edis, 1998). In the 1970s, the EU granted free access of the most industrial products to its market without asking for any reciprocity except Israel. Textile and agriculture sectors were not added (Montanari, 2007). When the Union's first enlargement was on the horizon in the early 1970s, the EU's ties with the Mediterranean countries widened with the official launch of Global Mediterranean Policy in 1972, including Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey and Israel.

Global Mediterranean Policy aimed at creating an industrial free trade area and the EU expected to achieve an utmost level of trade liberalization with the Mediterranean countries to complement the unilateral opening of EU markets at the end of the 1970s. Besides, there was an urgent need to make adjustments in the existing association agreements with the Mediterranean partners in order to make them operational for the new members, namely Britain, Denmark and Ireland (Gomez, 2003). Through Global Mediterranean Policy, the Union started to handle the Mediterranean as a political area, even when there was no transfer of authority to the EU by the member states in matters of politics and diplomacy (Bicchi, 2014). That means, there was a heavy dose of regionalism in the EU's approach towards the region from the very beginning. Since, the Global Mediterranean Policy aimed to promote economic and political development in the region to achieve a zone of peaceful co-existence (Asderaki, 2021). The EU's Mediterranean dimension was further strengthened when it finalized the Mediterranean enlargement in the 1980s with the membership of Greece, Spain and Portugal (Şençelebi, 2015). However, following to this round of enlargement, the EU has become largely self-sufficient in terms of Mediterranean agricultural products, such as olive oil (Gomez, 2023).

The Conference of Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean was gathered on 10 December 1990, also known as 5+5 talks, at foreign ministry level.

Influenced by the persistent problems on the other side of the Mediterranean, such as high birth rates, poor economic performance, rising fundamentalism and increasing migratory pressures, which create huge economic and social disparities between the two sides of the Mediterranean, the EU developed its renewed Mediterranean policy in 1990, defining financial cooperation, trade, the protection of human rights and the environment as the main pillars of its new approach (Edis, 1998). For the first time in the Union's history, the European Commission has underlined the link between security in Europe and peace and prosperity in the wider Mediterranean region (European Commission, 1989; Matutes, 1989).

European Union in the Mediterranean as a Competent Foreign Policy Actor

After the end of the Cold War, the issues of human rights, good governance and democracy were also seen as priorities in the Mediterranean, in contrast to the economic focus of previous EU policies towards the region. In other words, the impact of the change in the nature of the EU with the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 was also felt in the EU's attitude towards its Mediterranean partners. In addition to developing its own policies and instruments towards the region, the EU also supported the US-led Middle East Peace Process.

The Mediterranean region has a high degree of heterogeneity. The countries of the region differ significantly in terms of population size, income levels and political freedoms. As a result, the institutional framework of the EU's Mediterranean policy reflects a compromise between the changing interests across the Mediterranean (i.e. the different dynamics of the Western, Eastern or Maghreb Mediterranean) and those of the EU (Szilagyi, 2010). Moreover, the EU member states, that are also Mediterranean littoral states, have played the leading role in developing relations with the region. Under this subtitle, the various EU policies, namely Barcelona Process or Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, European Neighbourhood Policy and Union for the Mediterranean, that form the general

framework of relations with the Mediterranean are presented in a chronology according to the date of their introduction.

European Union's First Mediterranean Initiative: Barcelona Process

The Barcelona Process, also known as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership or Euro-Med, was launched in 1995 as an EU initiative to build partnerships between the countries of the Mediterranean (the EU and 12 Mediterranean countries – Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey) through economic, cultural and political cooperation. By launching the Barcelona Process, the EU redesigned its relations with its Mediterranean partners following the Cold War.

The objectives of the process were defined as shared prosperity, in particular through the establishment of a free trade area, which implies economic regionalism, increased cultural exchanges between peoples and societies, and political stability, including dialogue on security issues (Barcelona Declaration, 1995). Because the problems related to these three areas are seen as the root causes of instability in the region, giving rise to mass migration, fundamentalist extremism, terrorism, drugs and organised crime (Hahn, 2009). For the first time, the Barcelona Process has given the EU's cooperation with its Mediterranean partners a normative character that is clearly more than the previous weak references to the issues of human rights and good governance (Szczepankiewicz-Rudzka, 2021). Thus, after the Barcelona Process, the EU's relations with the Mediterranean countries have broadened in a way that includes areas beyond the economic sphere (Molnár, 2019). The activities carried out within the framework of the Barcelona Process financed by the MEDA programme of the EU in two successive phases covering the periods 1995-1999 and 2000-2006 (Bhutto, 2013).

The Barcelona Process has had both bilateral and regional dimensions. The bilateral dimension, based on the Association Agreements signed between the EU and each of the Mediterranean countries, addresses the individual characteristics of each country, while the multilateral dimension tackles the common problems of the region (Ion, 2015). Moreover, in response to the demands of the non-EU

Mediterranean partners, the process has been designed as an equal relationship (Attinà, 2004).

A Policy for All Including the Mediterranean: European Neighbourhood Policy

After completing the largest enlargement in its history in 2004, the EU felt the need to restructure its relations with its new neighbours, both to the east and to the south, within a new regional framework envisaging a privileged partnership (Viceré, & Venneri, 2023; Costello, 2021; Tabur, 2013). Accordingly, the rationale behind the launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) has been to share the benefits of enlargement with neighbouring countries in order to strengthen stability, security and prosperity for all (European Commission, 2004a), as well as to form a 'ring of friends' around the EU's borders and hinder the drawing of new dividing lines between the Union and its neighbours (Viceré, & Venneri, 2023). In this context, the action plans signed bilaterally to define the reform path of each ENP country also contained sentences referring to regional cooperation (European Commission, 2004b). However, for Bicchi, with the development of the ENP, the EU's approach to the Mediterranean has significantly lost its region-building objective and become more bilateral (Bicchi, 2014).

This is not, yet, to mean that the ENP framework replaced those already in place for the EU's relations with the wider neighbourhood. As the Commission's March 2003 communication stated, the ENP "would supplement and build on existing policies and arrangements" (European Commission, 2003). Hence, for the countries in the southern neighbourhood, the ENP was designed not a substitute for, but a complement to the Barcelona Process, which was frequently criticized due to the absence of tangible outcomes (Calleya, 2000). The southern neighbours covered in the ENP include a total of ten Mediterranean states: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, and Tunisia.

By means of the ENP, the EU intended to transfer to its neighbours its know-how on the transformation of countries and regions acquired through consecutive

waves of enlargement (European Commission, 2004a). For that reason, the ENP was designed with substantial borrowings from the enlargement policy, i.e. conditionality, provision of financial and technical assistances, access to some EU programmes, progress reports, and it can also be asserted that the major difference between the two lies in the absence of a membership perspective in the former (Gebhard, 2010; Montanari, 2007).

In 2005, the implementation of the ENP with respect to the southern dimension started, with the enforcement of the first Action Plans as a way to promote regionalism (Comelli, 2005), founded on existing association agreements. In return for implementing action plans, the Union offers support and financial assistance (European Commission, 2004b). This has been executed first by the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument by 2007 and then by the European Neighbourhood Instrument, later integrated into Global Europe (European Commission, 2021). The level of financial support available through various EU mechanisms has never been found sufficient by the Mediterranean partners (Adamczyk, 2015).

A New Impetus in the Relations with the Mediterranean: The Union for Mediterranean

Despite warnings against creating parallel structures with the potential to undermine each other, the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) was launched in 2008 as part of the Barcelona Process (Szilagyi, 2010). The idea for the UfM stemmed from former French President Nicolas Sarkozy's 2007 presidential campaign, in which he advocated the creation of a new initiative that would, on the one hand, be completely separate from the EU and its other previous regional initiatives and, on the other, include only the Mediterranean littoral states (Hierro, 2020; Del Sarto, 2011). During his election campaign speech in Toulon, Sarkozy took particular aim at the Barcelona Process, criticising it for not being a “partnership between peoples”. The EU embraced the idea, but warned that the initiative would build on existing policy frameworks such as the Barcelona Process

and the ENP Action Plans, and that it would keep the EU as a whole inside to avoid any internal divisions (Boer, 2011).

The Paris Declaration establishing the UfM states that, unlike the ENP, the new initiative was created as “a multilateral partnership with a view to enhancing the potential for regional integration and cohesion”. In this way, the Paris Summit anticipated that the UfM had the potential to make a significant contribution to addressing common challenges in the Euro-Mediterranean region. The initiative has been built on a broader Mediterranean approach. It currently includes all 27 EU countries, all ENP countries (except Libya, which has observer status), the other Mediterranean countries and the European Commission (Union for the Mediterranean, 2024). It is worth noting that the UfM includes countries – such as North Macedonia, Montenegro – that did not participate in either the Barcelona Process or the ENP.

In the light of the goals set out in the Paris Declaration, it is safe to say that the UfM's main objective is to give a new impetus to EU-supported regionalism in the Euro-Mediterranean region. In particular, it also aims to complement bilateral relations in both the Barcelona Process and the ENP. As well as to revitalise the Barcelona Process in three ways: (a) by strengthening the EU's relations with the Mediterranean countries; (b) by further implementing the concept of co-ownership; and (c) by implementing regional projects (Paris Declaration, 2008). In this initiative, unlike the Barcelona Process and the ENP, regional projects are defined as a core area of focus. As Boer (2011) notes, the UfM, presented as a “union of projects”, adapts a “development first, politics later” or “low politics first, high politics later” approach. Six priority areas – water, environment & blue economy, energy & climate change, transport & urban development, higher education & research, social & civil affairs, and economic development & employment – have been identified for such an approach (Union for the Mediterranean, 2023).

Also novel for the UfM, notes Boer (2011), is the notion of co-ownership among the UfM Mediterranean partners. Previously, the Barcelona Process and the ENP were often criticised for failing to provide a true partnership and an equal

voice within them. In an effort to address these criticisms, the UfM introduced the concept of co-ownership, meaning that it is co-chaired by an EU Member State and a Mediterranean Partner with veto rights at all stages of its governance and cooperation, mainly through the UfM Co-Presidency. This has increased the influence of non-EU Mediterranean countries on agenda-setting and the final results of negotiations (Winter, 2020). However, despite the initial intention to have equal ownership by European and non-European partners, the UfM has also been primarily controlled by the European side, which has eroded regionalisation efforts (Aliboni & Ammor 2009).

European Union in the Mediterranean: Developments after the Arab Spring

The EU has always reacted to developments in the Mediterranean. This is because the success of all European instruments for the region depends heavily on the dominance of a favourable political climate in the Mediterranean (Schumacher, 2001). The existing external pressure on authoritarian regimes in the Mediterranean region to undertake political reforms took on a new dimension when the populations of these countries began to challenge their regimes through widespread protests, including violent clashes (Aliboni, 2009). The process spread across the region and became known as the Arab Spring. Governments in many countries changed under the influence of internal unrest. As a consequence, the Arab Spring has become both a major challenge and a new window of opportunity for both the region and the EU. On the EU side, it has undeniably necessitated a policy reorientation (Asderaki, 2021). In fact, none of the policy tools in the hands of the EU has been sufficient to address the challenges in the neighbourhood beyond the 2010s (Delcour, & Petrova, 2023). However, deep divisions among member states and the prioritisation of the eurozone crisis forced the EU to remain passive and silent in the early days of the Arab Spring (Bisard, 2015).

The EU was supposed to achieve the goal of creating a ring of - peaceful, stable and prosperous – friends with extensive transformations on its borders, but

in the end it was surrounded by a ring of fire. For this reason, the ENP has been reviewed twice by EU leaders and partner countries since its launch in 2004 (Dekanozishvili, 2020). The overall aim was to improve its effectiveness and adaptability in the face of these developments facing the EU in the region (Costello, 2021). The first review, entitled “A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood”, took place in 2011 in the aftermath of the Arap Spring uprisings. Building on this acceptance, the review had three core objectives: “building and consolidating healthy democracies, pursuing sustainable economic growth and managing cross-border relations” (European Commission, 2011), all more or less concerned with stabilising the region in general and the Mediterranean in particular. With regard to the southern Mediterranean in particular, the EU highlighted a number of priorities, such as comprehensive institution-building programmes, dialogue on migration and mobility, and industrial cooperation. The review also proposed the use of an incentive-based strategy, known as “more for more”, to encourage closer cooperation with neighbouring countries to the south that have made more progress in political and institutional change.

On-going criticism of the first ENP review, which is mostly seen as just a label that brings less noticeable change in the south (Costello, 2021; Revel, 2016), led to a new review in 2015. Lannon (2015) identified recent developments in the south of the Union – such as the escalation of the migration crisis, Russia's open military involvement in Syria, and the occurrence of terrorist attacks and conflicts in some ENP countries – as the impetus for the second revision. The review also aimed to improve the performance of the ENP through the mechanisms of increased focus, differentiation, flexibility and ownership (European Commission, 2015a). In addition, new instruments were developed, such as the Civil Society Facility and the Endowment for Democracy, the Spring Programme, and the EU increased its financial assistance and investment in the region to support the reform process. The benefits (money, market access and mobility) of these EU facilities have been made conditional on the pace of reform (Kirchherr, 2012).

The main motivation for the EU's involvement in the Mediterranean in recent decades has been to ensure its security in the face of various disputes and conflicts that destabilise Mediterranean politics by providing a perfect ground for extremisms such as fundamentalism and terrorism, and the emergence of migratory flows (Adamczyk, 2015). In its Global Strategy (2016), the EU put forth that "Our security at home depends on peace beyond our borders" and emphasised the importance it attaches to the formation of cooperative regional orders worldwide, which are also based on its own peace and development, and made clear its intention to support this process. In this context, the Mediterranean has been identified by the EU as an area of potential regionalisation and the dominance of co-operative regionalisation in the region has been approached as a treatment to end the turmoil. Despite the EU's attempts to reach this objective, the south continues to be unstable for the Union (Dekanozishvili, 2020, p. 289) because of many factors including primarily that the Mediterranean partners continued to show limited interest in complying with EU norms and standards and the Union always acted with a high level of pragmatism prioritising its security-oriented domestic and foreign agenda (Fontana, 2015; Oktay, 2015; Costello, 2021). Crisis in Ukraine affected severely the eastern dimension of the ENP, but it also produced implications for the southern one. Especially after the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian War in 2022, the EU's high level of reliance on Russian energy sources turned into an overwhelming problem. After this historical moment, the significance of the Mediterranean region as a provider of both traditional (with newly discovered ones) and greener energy sources (i.e. sun, hydrogen) enhanced (Sotiriou, 2023).

Conclusion

The European Union faces a multitude of challenges stemming from the instability in its neighbouring regions, particularly in the Mediterranean. This instability has compelled the EU to prioritize regionalization in this area as a crucial foreign policy objective. The EU's strategy has been to guide the necessary

transformation processes of Mediterranean non-member states through a variety of policies that incorporate elements of regionalism, multilateralism, bilateralism, differentiation, convergence, and conditionality.

This shortfall in reaching the desired outcomes in the Mediterranean region highlights the Union's broader inability to effect significant transformation in countries where the prospect of EU membership is not on the table. In essence, the various incentives, or “carrots”, that the EU has employed to encourage its partners in the Mediterranean to emulate its model of regional integration have proven insufficient in delivering the anticipated results. Consequently, both the EU and its Mediterranean partners find themselves dissatisfied with the progress made thus far. These initiatives' slow pace and limited successes have led to frustration on both sides, as the intended goals for stability, cooperation, and integration remain elusive.

In the light of these challenges, the EU needs to rethink its approach to the Mediterranean. Instead of pursuing a fragmented set of policies that may unintentionally create further divisions, the EU would benefit from developing a comprehensive and unified policy framework that addresses all facets of cooperation in the region. Such an approach would not only optimise the EU's efforts, but also strengthen the effectiveness of its involvement with Mediterranean partners, ultimately encouraging a more cohesive and stable regional environment.

References

- Adamczyk, A. (2015). The Mediterranean Region – Great Challenges for the European Union. In B. J. Góralczyk (Ed.), *European Union on the Global Scene: United or Irrelevant?* 87-108, Centre for Europe Warsaw University: Warsaw.
- Aliboni, R. (2009). The Barcelona Process and its Prospects after the Union for the Mediterranean. *Hellenic Studies*, 17(2), 41-55.

- Asderaki, F. (2021). The EU in the Eastern Mediterranean: Multilateral and Bilateral Relations. In A. Tziampiris & F. Asderaki (Eds.), *The New Eastern Mediterranean Transformed*, 31-67, Springer: Cham.
- Attinà, F. (2004). The Barcelona Process, the role of the European Union and the lesson of the Western Mediterranean, *The Journal of North African Studies*, 9(2), 140-152.
- Barcelona Declaration. (1995, November). Retrieved from <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/summary/barcelona-declaration-and-euro-mediterranean-partnership.html>
- Bhutto, M. A. (2013). The Barcelona Declaration and the Role of EU in the Development of Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries. *Adam Akademi*, 3(1), 63-82.
- Bicchi, F. (2014). ‘Lost in transition:’ EU Foreign Policy and the European Neighbourhood Policy Post-Arab Spring. *L’Europe en Formation*, 371, 26-40.
- Bisard, J. (2015). The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership after the Arab Spring: How Can the EU Set Up a New Deal? *POMEAS Project Oped*. Retrieved from <http://pomeas.org/Home/>
- Brusylovska, O. (2023). Study of Regionalism: Should We Wait for Further Evolution? *International and Political Studies*, 36, 30-42.
- Calleya, S. C. (2000). Is the Barcelona Process Working? EU Policy in the Mediterranean. *ZEI Discussion Paper*, No. 75.
- Costello, A. (2021). European Neighbourhood Policy in the South Mediterranean. In T. Haastrup, L. Mah, & N. Duggan (Eds.), *The Routledge Handbook of EU- Africa Relations* (pp. 90-105). Routledge.
- Delcour, L., & I. Petrova. (2023). Europe’s Troubled Neighborhoods. In E. Jones & M. Hedberg (Eds.). *Europe Today* (6th Edition), 382-402. Royman and Littlefield: Maryland.
- Edis, R. (1998). Does the Barcelona Process Matter? *Mediterranean Politics*, 3(3), 93-105.

- EU Global Strategy. (2016, June). Retrieved from https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/global-strategy-european-unions-foreign-and-security-policy_en
- European Commission. (1989, November 23). Redirecting the Community's Mediterranean Policy.
- European Commission. (2003, March 11). Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament – Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours.
- European Commission. (2004, December 9). Communication from the Commission to the Council on the Commission Proposals for Action Plans under the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).
- Gebhard, C. 2010, The ENP's Strategic Conception and Design: Overstretching the Enlargement Template. In S. Wolff & R. Whitman (Eds.), *The European Neighbourhood Policy in Perspective: Context, Implementation and Impact*, 89-112, Palgrave Macmillan.
- Gomez, R. (2003). *Negotiating the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership*. Routledge: Oxon.
- Hahn, M. (2009). *The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: The Barcelona Process since 1995*. Diplomica Verlag: Hamburg.
- Ion, G. I. (2015). The European Union As A Driver Of Regional Cooperation In Its Southern Neighbourhood. CES Working Papers, 7(2a), 489-498.
- Kirchherr, J. (2012). The European Neighbourhood Policy has failed because of its own contradictions and small budget. But the Arab spring offers a renewed opportunity for the EU to reinvigorate the programme. Retrieved from <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/04/17/enpi-arab-spring/>
- Matutes, A. (1989). Commissioner Matutes reviews issues for the Community in the Mediterranean. *Speech to Pio Manzu Conference*.

- Molnár, A. (2019). The EU and the Mediterranean Region. In A. Molnár & Z. Gálik (Eds.). *Regional and Bilateral Relations of the European Union*, 29-48, Nemzeti Közszerológati Egyetem: Budapest.
- Montanari, M. (2007). The Barcelona Process and the Political Economy of Euro Mediterranean Trade Integration. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 45(5), 1011-1040.
- Panke, D., & Starkmann, A. (2021). Towards an increasing regionalization of international politics? An analysis of external competencies of regional international organizations. *Global Affairs*, 7(1), 43–65.
- Rüland, J. (2022). Regionalizing world politics? Regional organizations as actors in global fora. In J. Rüland & A. Caarapatoso (Eds.). *Handbook on Global Governance and Regionalism*, 293-305, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Schumacher, T. (2001). The Mediterranean as a New Foreign Policy Challenge? Sweden and the Barcelona Process, *Mediterranean Politics*, 6(3), 81-102.
- Song, W. (2007). Regionalisation, inter-regional cooperation and global governance. *Asia Europe Journal*, 5, 67–82.
- Sotiriou, S. A. (2023). Connecting Security with Sustainable Development in the Eastern Mediterranean and Generating Pay-offs for the European Union. *Mediterranean Politics*, 1–10.
- Szczepankiewicz-Rudzka, E. (2021). The European Union as a 'normative power' in the Mediterranean: a critical approach. In T. Eszter, C. Adrian-Gabriel, P. Nicolae, & E. László (Eds.). *Disintegration and Integration in East-Central Europe: Managing Diversity in the Process of European Integration*, 338-350, Debreceni Egyetem Gazdaságtudomány Kar: Kiadó.
- Szilágyi, I. (2010). The Barcelona Process Revisited and the SHB Presidency. *European and Regional Studies*, 1(2), 210-229.
- Şençelebi, C. (2015). European Union and the Mediterranean: Before and After the Arab Spring. *Ankara Avrupa Çalışmaları Dergisi*, 14(1), 141-154.
- Tabur, C. (2013). The Evolution of EU's Neighbourhood Policy Towards Eastern Europe. *Marmara Journal of European Studies*, 21(2), 55-72.

Winter, O. (2020). 25th Anniversary of the Barcelona Process: Has the Mediterranean Vision Come True? <https://www.inss.org.il/publication/barcelona-process/>

Viceré, M., & Venneri, G. (2023). *The European Union's Engagement with the Southern Mediterranean: Integrating the European Neighbourhood Policy*. Palgrave Macmillan: Cham.